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Abstract. This paper presents the results achieved while pursuing the
verification and validation of a train system behavior at the first steps
of development in an industrial context. A method is proposed, sup-
ported by preliminary results through the definition and verification of
constrained states and preconditions to use cases, as well as a structure
for the behavior.
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1 Introduction
How to perform validation on a system behavior is a field of research in systems
engineering [9]. Several techniques exist, such as tests, simulation, model check-
ing, etc. One key aspect, however, is that these techniques tend to be deployed
on design or implementation of a system, in order to check an integrated be-
havior that may not have been fully specified in the first place. A general truth
in system V&V is that the earlier an error is detected, the lower will be the
cost [11]. The most critical errors are those made when expressing the require-
ments. Works [2,6,18] show that one should specify, and if possible validate, the
expected behavior of the system as a whole using requirements and scenarios,
before any design or implementation. The main issue encountered to achieve
such a task is that a model of the system is required to define and support the
behavior.
In this paper, we present early validation results obtained thanks to the
definition of global states and modes describing a train and its behavior at op-
erational level. This work is conducted in the scope of a project in Bombardier
Transport (BT), a train manufacturing company. This project aims at establish-
ing a continuous validation method along a train system development process.
The target of the validation is the system behavior, which we define as the way
the system reacts under given circumstances.
1.1 Context
Over the years, BT has developed its own modeling method and SysML profile
to develop train system behaviors [8], based on existing approaches [13]. The
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first step in the specification, once the requirements have been analyzed, is to
define scenarios and the train life-cycle highlighting the services provided by the
system, and in which circumstances. The system behavior is to be validated. It
requires having an executable model of the whole system, and is currently done
later in the development process, using implemented software and simulated
hardware.
The development process and the V&V activities at system level are sepa-
rated in two BT teams: one specifying the system, and one conducting V&V
activities through co-simulation. The first team has skills in requirements anal-
ysis, functional specification and SysML modeling. The second focuses on tests,
programming and simulation. Those two teams have separate responsibilities, if
only due to the organization and according to good practices.
The behavior of a train system is defined through hundreds of use cases,
classified among hundreds of scopes. A scope is part of a functional breakdown
structure that classifies the use cases and the functions according to their domain
(e.g. energy, traction, etc.). The scopes are divided among different requirements
and functional engineers. In the chosen metro MOVIA case study, the specifica-
tion at operational level includes 277 use cases contained in 60 root scopes of a
classification system, divided among 12 functional and requirements engineers.
Each use case is described by a sequence diagram. Redundancy in specifi-
cation is avoided by having each engineer work on dedicated scopes. The in-
convenient is that they define behaviors separately, using a non-formalized nor
centralized knowledge regarding the system. Consequently, the specifications are
unrelated, without any integration. Rather than just specifying what the system-
to-be does, we have to specify “what” system we want to obtain [17], meaning
an abstract model of the system induced by the specifications. Such a model
implement an integrated behavior by conditioning the use cases and track their
effect on the evolution of the system state, without specifying how those use case
are realized inside the system.
Regarding the V&V activities, there are limitations in BT. Executable models
such as grafcet [5] have been used where parts were missing in the co-simulation,
but they correspond to designs provided by subsystems developers or external
providers. There is currently no solution nor models to check the system before
any implementation.
It is currently possible to check that the system does what it is expected
to do through tests, later in the process, using co-simulations or bench tests.
However, there are no practical solution for capturing unknown or unwanted
behavior. While it is possible to generate random inputs in a co-simulation, all
cases disproving a property have to be analyzed by an engineer to assess its
relevance. BT stopped using such a solution, as experience showed that checking
a property could result in hundreds or thousands of cases to analyze, most of
them irrelevant as they suppose a use of the train system that cannot happen
in reality. There is a need to constrain either the system behavior or its inputs.
1.2 Issues
Each functional engineer has a knowledge on a specific scope of the train, and
uses informal information from textual requirements and her own experience
to make specifications. There is no integration by the models. The overview
of the whole system is done informally by an individual. This leads to a lack
of a formal description of the system at specification level, which prevents its
automatic verification [17]. There is a need to express and check a common in-
formation regarding the whole system. The solution should verify automatically
the coherence of the information, so that engineers do no depend on the valida-
tion team for their specifications. On the other hand, the validation team should
receive an integrated, formalized and verified information to build an executable
model, rather than interpreting it on their own.
The integration of properties and behaviors results in a phenomenon called
emergence [1], as the system is more than the sum of its elements. There are
potential unknown and unwanted aspects of the system. Integrating the system
implies specifying the integration to avoid emergence. Specifying the integra-
tion is the role of the functional engineers, not of the validation team, which is
currently the one doing the integration when asked for a model of the system.
The different issues can be listed as a lack of:
– formalized requirements and properties for validation purposes,
– specification on the preconditions and circumstances of execution of system
functions,
– integrated representation of the system,
– solutions to structure the behavior before making a design,
– solutions to checking possible (unwanted) behaviors.
The goal of the proposed approach is not to give an optimized solution to the
V&V of the specification at a given level of development, or even globally, but
to provide a way to continuously conduct these activities along the development
process and with traceability of both V&V requirements, results and models,
based on an existing modeling method. Accessibility, simplicity and quickness
is preferred over exhaustivity and formalism, taking into account the industry
needs and capabilities. A given solution cannot be immediately implemented
across the entire development process. It has to be gradual, following the evolu-
tion of both the modeling method and the development process.
1.3 Related works
The proposed description of the system and its behavior is done using SysML
through state machines. The notion of state can be traced to the general system
theory [14]. Is is explained that defining the state of a system at a point in time is
necessary to express its behavior, which is linked to its evolution. State machines
have long been used to define and check system behaviors [7, 10,12].
The solution proposed in this paper aims to check a high-level specification
of the system behavior before design. The chosen approach to build a model
is similar to state analysis [15], in the sense that “states” of the system are
modeled separately and used to control the system behavior. The difference
being that in [15] the model is more detailed, specifying a control of hardware.
Ingham developed this approach in response to several issues, similar to those
encountered in BT:
– Subsystem-level functional decomposition fails to express the whole system
behavior
– There is a gap between the requirements and their implementation
– The system behavior is not explicitly specified
1.4 Method
In the solution, the system is modeled while separating its description from
its behavior. The description of the system relates here to its structure and
properties, and more generally what is known regrading the system at a point
in time. The system description is modeled using states, while the behavior is
modeled using modes. The concepts of states and modes used here come from a
previous work [3]. The method developed is divided into three parts:
– Modeling method
– Verification method
– Creation of the execution model
1.5 Case study
The method has been experimented on a real project data, using high level
specifications of a MOVIA metro. The focus was on the train main functions
when operating under normal conditions, excluding maintenance, emergencies,
restricted and degraded operations and secondary use cases (e.g., comfort fea-
tures) to concentrate on the train activation and driving operations. This resulted
in the selection of 54 use cases divided into 12 scopes. Following the presented
method, data was captured or specify in order to build an integrated model of
the system and check its behavior.
2 Behavior description through states
2.1 State definition
Types of states [3] are modeled as finite state machines arranged in an structure
of holons, similar to what is presented in [16]. A holon is en element that is
both a whole, something that can exist and function independently, and a part,
meaning it can be connected to other element as part of a structure. Here, each
finite state machine is a holon. Rather than representing the system behavior,
the holonic structure is used to established traceability between states, some
being deduced from others. This allows a first form of integration by providing
an evolving description of the system using correlated information.
Different types of states can be defined, each characterizing a kind of infor-
mation regarding the system. For a train, we can consider:
– The operability: the readiness of the train
– The energy supply: the source used to power the train
– The environment: the place where the train is operated
– ...
Each type of state can take the value of a corresponding set of state values.
While they may appear as mere variables, those types of states are not necessarily
measured or calculated, as they can express a “known” information, as it is the
case for the operability. What truly differentiates a type of state is that its state
values change depending on the target it qualifies and the adopted point of view.
Types of state express pieces of information that have been identified and sep-
arated to characterize the conditions under which the system is used and where
the different use cases can be performed. As such, the information contained in
a given type of state can be abstract. Defining a type of state is valuable on its
own, as the following example will show.
Table 1. Definition of the type of state operability
Operability
Target The train system
Information The train operability
Context The train daily life-cycle
Abstraction level System level
View Point of view of the train
Fig. 1. State values and transitions of the type of state operability
A good example of a type of state used to describe the train system is its
operability, as defined in Table 1. Its values and constraints on transitions are
described by a state machine in Figure 1. It is a type of state that indicates the
capability of the train to pursue a mission. It mainly depends on the status of
the train energy supply and the activation of internal systems. This information
is expressed at the system level, which is treated like a black box.
Operability is defined before making a design, and most use cases can be
performed for several states of operability. It means that, on its own, operability
is first an abstract type of state with no practical ways of evaluating it, is too
broad to characterize use cases on its own but still provides a key information
to the user regarding the train utilization and evolution.
2.2 States in the case study
Fifteen types of states were established to describe the system operational condi-
tion and situation for the selected use cases. A sample of them with their possible
values is shown in Table 2, with information regarding whether the train moves,
if it is on a section with an electrical line (not neutral) and which source of
energy is supplying the train systems. The State space of each of the 15 types of
states varies from 2 to 6 different values.
Table 2. Example of types of state describing a train operational status
Movement NeutralSection
Electrical
Supply
Moving Neutral Full internal supply
Standstill Not neutral Internal supply depleted
Line supply
No supply
Partial internal supply
Shore supply
Train states characterize the train at its own level of granularity, from its
own point of view, in the context of its whole life-cycle. This information can be
found in part in the scenarios defined in the operability analysis, as they spec-
ify circumstances under which use cases are performed. Other information are
obtained through empirical experience and requirement analysis. These infor-
mation, independently from the behavior, can be constrained by physical laws,
properties to be respected, inter-dependencies, etc.
2.3 State constraints
Without a design and working at system level, there may be an issue in measuring
or evaluating some of the states. What can be done is defining possible state
configurations. To do so, the different types of states can be linked by constraints
and properties that condition the values (states) they can or should take in
regard of each other. Those constraints are defined in relation to the system,
and not to its functions. Consequently, establishing a correlation between them
through constraints results in an integrated description of the system that will
be navigated through its behavior.
The system behavior depends in parts on its circumstances, meaning its situ-
ation in relation to a context. They can be described by its states. The evaluation
of all types of state is a configuration describing the train circumstances.
In order to check the system behavior, it is important to define as many
relevant constraints as possible on the state values forming configurations to re-
duce emergence. The more the system is constrained, the less unknown behaviors
there will be, and the less cases there will be to consider. While over-constraining
the system is a risk, it is not an issue in our setting: since checking the expected
behavior is possible, any issue due to over-constraining can be detected early
enough. The problem can then be solved, or in the worst case the specifications
or the constraints were initially wrong or cannot be fulfilled or checked at this
point. On the other hand, a lack of constraints will result in more unknown cases
and will present the risk to perform analysis on irrelevant cases while overlooking
errors in others.
Types of states can be used to check properties of the system. Definition of
such properties can lead to the creation of more types of states, or constraints
put on them. For example, a train “visibility” is ensured when the train has
its lights systems activated under the right circumstances. It can be defined
as a constraint on the other types of states to ensure that the train would
be evaluated as “visible” when the circumstances ask for it. Such constraints
come from requirements and knowledge regarding the expected system. They
can constitute formal validation requirements when expressed using states.
We define two types of constraints: simple constraints and complex con-
straints. Simple constraints are defined between pairs of states values and can be
captured and specified by engineers. All possible simple constraints are consid-
ered, leading to new specifications and a first integration of the system states.
Complex constraints represent known or desired constraints between three or
more states values and cannot be exhaustively captured.
Let us denote T = {t1, ..., tn} as the set of the types of states, with n the
number of types of states defined. Every types of state corresponds to a set of
possible state values: ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},∃k | ti = {si1, ..., sik}. For every state value
s, we also denote by s the logical proposition: “the system is in state s”.
Two incompatibles states values x, y of two different types of states ti, tj are
represented by the simple constraint ¬(x ∧ y). For all types of states, we can
define simple constraints as a set of clauses simpleConsts such as:
simpleConsts ⊆ {x ∨ y|∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, i 6= j,∀x, y ∈ ti × tj} (1)
The complex constraints are defined by forbidding combinations of state
values taken from subsets of three or more types of states. Considering a group
of types of states t1, ..., tk with k >= 3, a complex constraint compConst can be
defined as all combination of state values among the subsets t′1, ..., t′k such that
t′i ⊆ ti
compConst = ∧x1,...,xk∈t′1,...,t′k(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) (2)
2.4 State constraints in the case study
Listing the values of the different types of states, a square matrix can be created
were engineers can specify simple constraints between states values. Compatible
pairs of states values of two different types of states are marked by a 1 in the
matrix, and by a 0 otherwise. An example from the case study is given in Table 3,
using values from the types of states presented in Table 2. Only part of the square
matrix is presented.
Table 3. Simple constraints between types of states values
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Complex constraints are defined as the rows of another matrix. The columns
of this matrix correspond to the states values of each types of states. Each row
specifies the subsets of state values involved in the constraint, represented by the
indicator function (i.e, a 1 means the state is included in the subset). This list
has not the ambition of being exhaustive, only expressing known properties from
requirements and experience. Contrary to simple constraints, it is not practical,
or even possible, to ask for engineers to think of all possible complex constraints.
It also presents the risk to repeat complex constraints already induced by simple
ones. Besides, specifying the simple constraints and correcting them often leads
to the definition of new complex ones. Correcting a simple constraint means
deleting it, as it was too strict and blocked the realization of use cases, and
replacing it by a complex constraint that is more specific and carries the actual
intent of the initial simple constraint. They often would not have been specified
or thought of by other ways. An example of complex constraint C1 is given in
Table 4.
2.5 Use case pre-conditions
States capture the circumstances in which a use case is possible. The precondi-
tions should capture every possible configuration in which a use case is possible,
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Table 4. Exemple of a complex constraint
the limitations being expressed through the constraints. A precondition has a
subset of authorized state values for each type of state. Considering the subsets
t′1, ..., t
′
n of the types of states T for a given precondition precond, we have:
precond = ∧i∈1,..,n(∨s∈t′
i
s) (3)
Table 5. Exemple of a use case precondition
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Use cases preconditions are defined in a matrix indicating which values of
each type of states are compatible with their realizations. Compatible values are
marked with a one, incompatible ones with a zero. Those preconditions indicate
which values can and should be found in a configuration satisfying the use case
preconditions, but do not imply that all combinations of compatible values are
possible, as there are constraints to consider. Considering only preconditions
of this form is justified by the fact that engineers can focus on the use cases
preconditions one state at a time.
2.6 Use case pre-conditions in the case study
An example is given in Table 5 (only authorized values have been displayed for
the energy supply). Initially, waking up the train following a scenario to put it
into service was not possible as a constraint indicated that a train could not
be still on a neutral section. A neutral section is a section where there is no
electrical supply from the line, which is the case where the train is parked. The
reason for this error was that engineers made the specification while thinking
of the train as performing a mission on the main line. A neutral section can
be found on the main line, in which case a train should indeed not stop, but a
train in a depot is also technically on a neutral section, but still needs to move
on its own. This lead to the definition of types of states expressing that the
train was in a mission or not, and what its environment is, as well as expressing
complex constraints to enforce what was intended in the original specification.
The initial specifications on their own were either incomplete or not-binding,
letting developers of subsystems interpret the information and correct it.
3 Verification method
In order to develop an integrated model to verify and validate the system’s
expected behavior, it is necessary to first have proper inputs. To that end, a
solution has been developed for engineers to check some predefined properties of
their specifications. The solution is automatic and works like a black box: it is
a script coded in R language that takes directly the matrices defined previously
as inputs, without a need for other modeling activities. The technical details are
presented first, the results and errors detected being discussed after.
3.1 State constraints verification
Two basic sanity checks are performed:
1. There is at least one compatible value between two state types.
2. Each state value appears in at least one possible state configuration.
Performing the first sanity check implies checking that the simple constraint
matrix is correctly filled.
Calculating possible configuration is done by a script using applications of
the graph theory [4]. The solution is intended to correspond to the industrial
practice and needs, and as such is not optimal. A more elaborate solution is
currently not needed considering that the calculation only take seconds.
The script performs the following actions, logging errors at each check step:
– Check that the matrix is correctly filled.
– Calculate all possible configurations according to simple constraints
– Filter possible configurations using complex constraints.
– Check the presence of each state value in at least one of configuration of the
filtered list.
3.2 Use case preconditions verification
For every use case we check that:
– Its precondition admits at least one possible configuration regarding the state
constraints
– Each authorized state value appears in at least one possible state configura-
tion.
The script performs the following actions, logging errors at each check step
and for each use case:
– Calculate possible configurations
– Check the presence of each authorized state value in a least one of the possible
configurations.
– Filter the configurations with complex constraints. Check again for the ex-
istence of a solution.
– Check the presence of each authorized state value in a least one of configu-
ration of the filtered list.
Simple constraints and complex constraints are applied and checked sepa-
rately to facilitate their analysis and correction.
3.3 Results
The results can easily be formatted and customized, in our case an Excel file.
The case study showed that:
– Out of 15 types of states, 2 pairs initially lacked authorized values between
them.
– Out of 45 state values, 6 were not initially included in any possible configu-
rations.
– 5 more complex constraints were defined after correcting the simple con-
straints.
– Out of 54 use cases, 7 initially lacked authorized values.
– 13 use cases did not initially admit a single configuration as solution.
– 51 use cases had unused values, for a total of 148 cases.
The lack of authorized values between types of states or in preconditions
were simple omissions. State values not included in any possible configurations
were due to the following errors:
– State were ill-interpreted by the engineers.
– Engineers adopted a point of view that was too narrow, overlooking specific
cases were some states values were compatible.
Nearly all use cases had unused state values, meaning state values authorized
in the preconditions but not present in any of the related possible configurations.
In order of increasing severity, it could mean that:
– a given state was deemed possible in the preconditions but was not,
– the use case should have admitted a configuration with this state but its
preconditions were too narrow,
– there was an issue in the way the constraints were defined, blocking possible
configurations.
As the states are used for the preconditions of all use cases and their con-
straints are used in the calculations of all possible state configurations, an error
in their definition is where it has the most severe impact.
The method proved that when integrating specified information on current
validated steps of a project, there were in fact many errors and misunderstanding
that would have to be corrected later on. Those errors were detected here at an
earlier stage in the process. In addition, this analysis provides new or proper
specifications as opposed to partial or informal ones.
4 Execution model
According to our approach, the fundamental unit for organizing the system de-
scription is the state, and the fundamental unit for organizing the behavior is
the mode. The behavior is modeled by hierarchical state machines, here SysML
statecharts, where “state” modeling elements correspond to our concept of mode.
Each mode can be activated after checking that the system state configuration
allows it and that the right sequence of activities has been executed. A mode
here characterizes use cases of the system while specific conditions on the system
state are true.
4.1 Holonic structure for states
The system description is modeled following this process:
1. Create a SysML block for each type of states.
2. Model each type of state as a non-hierarchical statechart inside each block.
3. Create a signal for every transition of state values.
4. Create the structure around state blocks by creating and linking ports
5. Enclose all state in one SysML block contained by the system block.
6. Define inputs ports for signals updating state values from environment or
the system behavior.
4.2 Structure of the behavior
There is a need for both a specification and an executable model of the whole
system and its behavior. In order to integrate the specification, it should be
possible to specify dynamic aspects of the use cases. It requires knowing which
use case can be realized in a given situation and how their possible realization
evolves. Conditions enabling the realization of a use case correspond to our
definition of a mode. The preconditions defined earlier enable to know when a
use can can be performed, and can be considered as a basis for defining modes.
We will now define a structure of modes to analyze, integrate and model the
behavior. We define several types of modes:
– Use case mode: conditions the realization of a given use case
– Scope mode: a mode defined by a precondition composed of subsets that are
the union of authorized values in all preconditions of all use cases modes
under the corresponding scope.
– Abstract mode: conditions the activation of one or several scope mode.
The way the scope modes and abstract modes are defined is potentially larger
than the disjunction of use case preconditions and scope mode conditions they
refer to, in order to cover a broader context and follow the evolutions of use case
transition. This is also a way of ensuring that we have implication relationships
between the different modes, something we need to build a structure around
them.
Use case modes directly condition the execution of use cases. Other types of
modes only condition them in an indirect way by conditioning the use case modes
or the modes containing those. A mode is defined by the use cases it characterizes
(directly or not) and the conditions in which it is activated. As the relationship
between modes and use cases is established, the main characteristic needed for
the definition of new modes is the conditions for which they are activated.
The conditions for a mode can be considered as a group of subsets of each
types of states’s values. As long as all state values of a state configuration are
part of these subsets, the mode is active. Given T = {t1, ..., tn} the set of all
types of states, a mode has the same structure as a UC precondition (see section
2.5) and is defined by a set of subsets t′i ⊆ ti.
The behavior can be modeled using statecharts. As the use cases are managed
in scopes allocated to different engineers and that they are too numerous to be
put in one statechart, all use cases modes should be put under global modes
corresponding to their scope, where they are to be modeled in a corresponding
statechart. Considering {t′1, ..., t′n} the conditions of a scope mode, we define the
conditions of the k use cases under this scope as ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}, {t′j1, ..., t′jn}. We
have:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, t′i = ∪kj=1t′ji (4)
In order to integrate the statecharts defined in each scope, there needs to
be a way to evaluate whether the different scopes modes are activated or not.
We propose to create a structure of implications enabling to determine activated
modes by evaluating their conditions.
Satisfying the conditions of a use case mode means the conditions of its scope
mode are satisfied: activating a use case mode implies activating its scope mode.
In the same way, some scope mode could imply others, which is the basis for our
implication structure. Some scope modes could also have the same conditions,
in which case we create one statechart in each scope to specify the behavior but
only define one corresponding scope mode.
All scopes modes may not be linked by implication relationships, in which
case we define abstract modes. Abstract modes are obtained by the union of two
modes preconditions. We only define abstract modes for pairs of scope modes
that do not imply any other.
4.3 Structure of modes in the case study
Fig. 2. Implication structure of scope modes and abstract modes
The structure of modes is generated thanks to a script. The result of its ap-
plication on the case study is shown in Figure 2, using the modes of 6 scopes for
visibility. As the modes imply each other, a path of implication correspond to
preconditions that are more and more specific. Keeping only the longest paths,
obtained by transitive reduction (which as been applied in the example), corre-
spond to progressive definitions of increasing details in the preconditions that
are each evaluated once.
5 Method
The system is modeled while considering separately its states and its behavior.
The same approach is then applied on its elements, detailing the behavior while
maintaining states and their traceability. The goal is to specify and check an
integrated system and its behavior that would otherwise be either unspecified or
emergent depending on the level of development. The method developed follows
this process:
1. Define types of states providing information on the system at its own level
of granularity.
2. Define simple and complex constraints between the values of different types
of states to correlate the information.
3. Define enabling circumstances of the system use cases using the system
states.
4. Check all states constraints and use cases preconditions.
5. Generate the structure of modes.
6. Build the system description and behavior models.
Once an integrated model of the system is obtained, more V&V activities
can be performed, such as simulation. The model evolves by completing its ele-
ments models, their description (states), and the behavior detailed amongst all
elements.
The information expressed by the states can evolve internally through deduc-
tion amongst types of states. They also can be modified by the behavior or be
communicated by the environment. The use cases, however, express interaction
with the system processed through its behavior, and do not directly change the
system state. This way, both the behavior and the actions on the system can
evolve and be detailed without modifying the description of the system.
6 Conclusion and perspectives
Our results helped proving that our definition of system states enables to spec-
ify the system and its behavior, its evolution and the conditions under which
use cases can be performed. The most direct benefit of this work is a means
to check the preconditions of the use cases, not just individually but as part
of a constrained whole. The simplicity of the solution makes it available to any
engineer working on use case specification and can be easily integrated in an ex-
isting method, process or tool. One of the gains expressed by the BT engineers
who experimented our approach was that preconditions were clearer but more
importantly centralized, and instead of repeating similar information and pre-
conditions in many requirements, those information are expressed by the same
elements, the states.
The method presented does not guarantee to cover all states of the system,
nor all details of its behavior. It simply aims at specifying the integration of
the system to check its coherence and reduce emergence in its properties and
behavior. The method remains to be deployed on a whole project for validation
purposes. It also only covers discrete event phenomena.
The next step is to perform V&V activities on the model and then conduct
the same analysis on a developed design using part of the model to check the
continuity.
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